A Three-Stage Stochastic Peer-to-Peer Market Clearing Model with
  Real-Time Reserve Activation by Bjarghov, Sigurd et al.
A Three-Stage Stochastic Peer-to-Peer Market
Clearing Model with Real-Time Reserve
Activation
Sigurd Bjarghov
Christian Ø. Naversen
Kasper Thorvaldsen
Hossein Farahmand
Department of Electric Power Engineering
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
Trondheim, Norway
sigurd.bjarghov@ntnu.no
Abstract
With an increasing share of volatile renewables, more flexibility is
needed to balance the electricity system. In order to enable local flex-
ibility, we suggest a three-stage stochastic market clearing model using
community-based peer-to-peer (P2P) trading with participation in the
short term reserve markets. With this approach, internal intraday (IID)
and real-time (IRT) markets are cleared where peers can trade to balance
their day-ahead market position under uncertainty in load and activation
of reserves. Results show increased participation of 19 and 44 % in reserve
markets when P2P IID and IRT is introduced. We illustrate the appli-
cation of the model and give advice for the future reserve market design
highlighting necessary changes in order to unlock end-user flexibility to
the reserve market.
Nomenclature
Indices and Sets
P Set of peers, index p and q
Sa Set of 3rd stage reserve activation scen., index a
Sl Set of 2nd stage load realization scen., index l
Th Set of time steps, index t
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Tm Set of time steps inside t, index τ
Parameters
∆τ Sub-hour time step coefficient [ τt ]
ηchp , η
dis
p Battery charging/discharging efficiency [%]
pi↑tτa, pi
↓
tτa % of up-/downward reserve bid activated [%]
ρl, ρa Probability of scenario l, a
Omaxp Maximum battery state of charge [kWh]
Ominp Minimum battery state of charge [kWh]
PP2P,IID Additional cost of IID P2P trading [ ectkWh ]
PP2P,IRT Additional cost of IRT P2P trading [ ectkWh ]
P IDt , P
RT
t External intraday and real-time price [
ect
kWh ]
PDAt Day-ahead spot price [
ect
kWh ]
PFCRt Frequency containment reserve price [
ect
kW ]
PGTt Grid tariff cost [
ect
kWh ]
PVpt Photovoltaic production [kWh]
Qchp , Q
dis
p Maximum battery (dis)charging power [kW]
W loadpt Inflexible load [kWh]
Variables
χRT↓ptτla Real-time balancing electricity bought [kWh]
χRT↑ptτla Real-time balancing electricity bought [kWh]
χID↓ptl Intraday balancing electricity bought [kWh]
χID↑ptl Intraday balancing electricity bought [kWh]
χbuypt , χ
sell
pt Purchased/sold DA electricity [kWh]
δ3rdptτla 3rd st. binary variable (dis)charge indicator [0,1]
δ2ndptl 2nd st. binary variable (dis)charge indicator [0,1]
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ψbuypqtτla IRT P2P electricity bought from p to q [kWh]
ψsellpqtτla IRT P2P electricity sold from p to q [kWh]
ψbuypqtl IID P2P electricity bought from p to q [kWh]
ψsellpqtl IID P2P electricity sold from p to q [kWh]
σchptτla 3rd stage battery charging [kWh]
σdisptτla 3rd stage battery discharging [kWh]
σsocptτla 3rd stage battery state of charge [kWh]
σchptl, σ
dis
ptl 2nd stage battery (dis)charging [kWh]
σsocptl 2nd stage battery state of charge [kWh]
r↑pt, r
↓
pt Up-/downward DA reserve bid [kW]
1 Introduction
In the last decade, we have witnessed a massive price development in distributed
energy resources (DER), both in electricity production and storage. This has
lead to a fundamental change in our power systems where production and con-
sumption are widespread in the system. The ever increasing share of decentral-
ized production indicates a need for change in our market design. The adaptive
role is pushed towards the demand side to a greater extent, after traditionally
being on the production side. Another significant development in the last decade
is ICT allowing faster, more accurate and more reliable communications.
Together, ICT and DER are the two main technological enablers for a de-
centralized peer-to-peer based market design. Especially peer-to-peer trading
and local energy/flexibility markets are emerging as a futuristic, but a possi-
ble alternative to the current market structure which has limited capabilities
in terms of integrating both large and small scale intermittent renewable elec-
tricity production, especially behind the meter. A peer-to-peer market design
is quite demanding in terms of resolution. Such a redesign requires an increase
in the number of trades/transactions, number of agents, time resolution, and
volume resolution. Technological enablers are not the only driver towards de-
centralized electricity markets. Consumer willingness to participate is key for
a consumer-centric market revolution to take place. Engaged consumers are
installing PV panels to become less reliant on conventional (often CO2 inten-
sive) power, showing a clear social commitment towards supporting the energy
transition and the green shift.
One of the main challenges for the power system when changing from large
controllable power plants to numerous small scale intermittent production units
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is the ability to provide reserve power when demand and supply are at a mis-
match. As wind and solar appear to win the profitability race of renewables,
demand side needs to take a more significant responsibility of delivering flexibil-
ity in the system by participating in reserve markets. Because the demand side
mostly consists of many small agents, the number of bids will vastly increase.
To handle a significant increase in agents, it is natural to assume that there
will be decentralized markets where prosumers take an active role in energy trad-
ing. This includes interacting with other consumers and prosumers to establish
bilateral energy contracts. Potential future decentralized electricity market de-
signs have been described in [1], where the authors describe different prosumer
era market designs. The main candidates vary from full peer-to-peer markets
with complete freedom of trades to organized, community-based markets with
a clear set of participants. In addition, hybrid solutions with islanded micro-
grids or connected microgrids are described. Advantages and disadvantages of
the potential market designs are thoroughly described in [2]. Full peer-to-peer
trading represents the most futuristic and democratic approach but has severe
challenges such as high investment costs in ICT for full scalability and reliability
under a non-central control scheme. In addition, high computational effort to
convergence to a market clearing in a non-pool based market is required, with
scalability mentioned as a central issue in [3] and [4], especially when product
differentiation is introduced. As full peer-to-peer market clearing problems of-
ten become intractable, community-based peer-to-peer markets with a limited
number of peers appear as a more robust approach as scalability is less of an
issue. By forming communities or energy collectives [5], a community manager
supervises trades and assures convergence to system optimality. Communities
can be formed in parts of the grid where there is no congestion. Alternatively,
a grid tariff can be enforced if energy collectives choose to trade regardless of
grid congestions [6]. Common for [3–6] is the use of distributed optimization
in order to clear the decentralized market, often in the form of Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) or Consensus ADMM (progressive
hedging) which converges to a local market energy price given all the agents’
utility functions. Another distributed optimization technique known as Con-
sensus + Innovation also shows potential for multiagent coordination [7].
There is a number of peer-to-peer pilot projects ongoing such as the Brooklyn
Microgrid [8], where excess production from photovoltaics is sold to neighbours
in the microgrid in a peer-to-peer marketplace. With decreasing battery costs,
a natural next step is to look into the role of battery flexibility peer-to-peer
markets. While batteries at peer level reduce overall costs, a community-owned
battery reduces import peaks and is more grid friendly [9]. Similar results are
found in [10], although the system cost minimization approach is based on coop-
eration + savings allocations in the community. Still, intraday trading between
peers in order to balance out uncertainty in load and renewable production
increases the savings drastically.
By formulating the peer-to-peer optimization problem as a two-stage stochas-
tic program, [10] highlights the need for an internal intraday peer-to-peer market
to deal with uncertainty in net load in half-hourly intervals. However, 15-minute
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market resolutions are quite common in Central Europe and the Nordics are
planning to follow in order to deal with high uncertainty and fluctuations in
load and renewable production [11]. Real-time markets are becoming more and
more relevant to deal with very short term imbalance, and three-stage market
clearing models are outperforming two-stage representations of intraday and
real-time markets [12], with the three stages representing day-ahead, intraday
and real-time markets. Meanwhile, [13] concludes that batteries can increase
participation in frequency containment reserve (FCR) markets significantly if
the minimum duration of delivery is decreased to 15 minutes from today’s 30
minutes, due to the relatively small energy content of batteries. Lack of energy
content is also relevant in some cascaded hydropower systems, where reserve
bids must respect the available energy content in hydro reservoirs [14]. How-
ever, activation of FCR is seldom modelled, although the balancing of the agents’
market positions is a complex planning problem when uncertainty in activation
is considered.
The contributions in this paper are the following:
• We develop a mixed-integer three-stage stochastic programming model to
determine optimal bidding in day-ahead and reserve markets for end-users
in a community-based P2P market (assuming cooperative scheduling)
• We model stochastic activation of reserve market participation from bat-
teries at prosumer level with a 5-minute resolution to analyze end-user
capability of delivering reserve in real-time
• We model an intraday and real-time peer-to-peer market where peers can
trade internally to balance their day-ahead market positions under uncer-
tainty in load and activation of reserve
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the peer-
to-peer and future reserve market design. Section 3 provides a mathematical
formulation of the three-stage optimization problem, whereas Section 4 describes
the performed case study. Results are then presented and discussed in Section 5
followed by conclusions and future work suggestions in Section 6.
2 Market design
2.1 Community-based peer-to-peer market
In this paper, a community-based P2P approach is chosen due to the partici-
pation in ancillary service markets, in this case, FFR and FCR. End-users are
often not aware of their electricity consumption and even less about which grid
service markets they should participate in. How to bid, evaluating market po-
sitions and dealing with activation of reserves should thus be handled by the
community manager on behalf of the end-users. One of the main benefits of
this market structure is the reduced need for action from end-users. Both in
day-ahead and reserve markets, there is always a chance of placing bids that are
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sub-optimal, which leads to high penalty costs when the market position is not
met. Moving this responsibility to the community manager is a clear advantage
and is, to some extent, similar to the aggregator in terms of risk management.
Inside the community, peers can trade freely with each other. It is assumed
that the grid between the end-users is owned by the community. As a con-
sequence, interaction with the external market goes through the community
manager who manages the day-ahead and reserve bids of the end-users. Grid
tariffs and taxes only need to be paid from import over the community main-
meter. In the case of load imbalance, peers can trade to balance their market
position in the community internal intraday market (IID). Balance can also
be bought on the external intraday market (EID) for a higher price. Finally,
peers who have participated in the reserve market get activation signals from
the TSO, causing a need to deliver energy in real-time. If not dealt with using
their own battery, peers can trade in the internal and external real-time market
(IRT and ERT), where the latter being much more expensive.
When activated, peers need to deliver the energy requested by the TSO,
which is random from 0-100 % of the placed bid. The activation restricts end-
users from placing bids in the reserve options market, which they are unable
to deliver. One of the tricky consequences of integrating end-users in reserve
markets is that they traditionally do not participate in day-ahead spot markets,
and thus have no baseline as a reference unlike traditional power plants par-
ticipating in reserve markets. This is solved by including the end-users in the
day-ahead market, letting the community manager bid in the day-ahead market
on behalf of the end-user given expected scenarios of net load and activations.
Note that in this approach, we do not model peer utility functions, meaning
that it is, in essence, a community cost minimization optimization problem.
Cost/savings allocation is assumed but is not included in this paper. However,
prices are set up in a manner which incentivizes self-balancing and trading inside
the community in case of imbalance. Implicitly, peers will at first balance their
consumption. If this is not possible in a specific scenario, balancing through
internal community peer-to-peer trading is the second cheapest option, whereas
buying balancing power on the external market is the last and most expensive
option.
2.2 FCR and FFR markets
It is common practice for the system operator to procure reserve production
capacity to secure the stability of the power system. In Europe, the reserve
capacity is usually split into several products with different activation times
traded in different markets with the system operator as the only buyer. The
reserves with the quickest response time, often categorized as primary reserves or
(FCR), are automatically activated if there is a change in the system frequency.
In Europe, the FCR should be fully activated within 30 seconds of the deviation
[15]. After this point, the secondary reserves will replace the FCR to free them
up for further use.
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There are several different reserve products within the primary reserve cat-
egory, and these products vary between countries. For instance, the Norwegian
TSO Statnett procures symmetric FCR-N reserves for deviations within ±0.1
Hz in addition to upward FCR-D reserves which are used when the frequency
drops below 49.9 Hz. Statnett is currently developing an FCR-D product for
downward regulation [16]. There is an ongoing effort to harmonize reserve prod-
ucts across Europe to enable efficienct reserve exchange. An example of this is
the FCR cooperation between several of the continental European TSOs, where
the FCR products are standardized and traded in a single market across coun-
tries [17].
FCR is commonly traded as a symmetric product, which means that partic-
ipants have to provide the sold capacity for both up and downward regulation.
In relation to the European FCR cooperation project, stakeholders had mixed
responses to whether asymmetric FCR products should be offered in the new
shared market. The main concern was the additional cost and administrative
complexity, which lead to the common FCR market only allowing symmetric
products [17].
As increasing power fluctuations challenges frequency stability, some TSOs
are considering new products falls under the category of synthetic inertia or fast-
frequency reserves (FFR). FFR is a system service that delivers a fast power
change to mitigate the effect of reduced inertial response so that that frequency
stability can be maintained. The TSO of Great Britain, National Grid, has
launched an FFR-service called ”Enhanced Frequency Response” (EFR), and
fully contracted reserves must be delivered within one second [18].
Figure 1: Time horizon for activation of FFR and FCR in Norway. The consid-
ered reserve activation time period is shown in yellow.
In low-inertia situation in the Nordic system, the traditional hydropower-
based FCR-D may not be sufficient to keep the frequency within normal oper-
ating range in the event of a dimensioning incident. One alternative solution to
maintain secure operation security of power supply is a complimentary service
with a response faster than FCR-D. In 2018, the Norwegian TSO, Statnett,
conducted a pilot project on FFR where contracted reserves activated within 2
seconds [19] as shown in Figure 1. The Nordic TSOs are currently considering
introducing the FFR product on the ancillary market, and a market release is
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anticipated in 2020 [19].
In this paper, we assume 5 minute activation periods, but we do not dif-
ferentiate between FFR and FCR. However, the initial FFR pilot [19] conclude
that batteries are well suited to deliver such reserves due to the fast response
time.
2.3 Future reserve market design
FCR markets have traditionally been symmetric as the service is designed to
deal with small, short term deviations in frequency which naturally happen
both ways. Symmetric bidding also reduces administration costs for the TSO.
However, it is questionable whether or not this is the way to go when designing
the future FCR market. Firstly, more and more small scale agents need to
participate in order to deal with increased volatility in production due to the
increasing renewable share in the EU. There is clearly a vast potential in demand
response which needs to be unlocked. However, many of the potential agents
have assets which only can participate upward or downward (mostly upward by
curtailing load). A significant portion of the potential flexibility will probably
not be able to participate if symmetric bids are required. Batteries will also
participate less in reserve markets while self-balancing, as a full or empty battery
prohibits participation. In addition, minimum bid sizes must be dramatically
reduced in order for demand response to participate. This can partially be solved
by using communities or aggregators to avoid tiny bids. Still, the minimum
capacity of 1 MW which is common in many reserve markets today is quite far
away from including any type of residential demand response. Reducing bid
size requirements will increase the number of bids and administration costs for
the TSO. One could argue that this reduces market efficiency. Moreover, an
increased share of renewables indicates that more reserves must be unlocked to
meet future reserve requirements.
3 Model
The suggested approach is a three-stage stochastic mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming model, designed to simulate P2P market trading the day-ahead, IID
and IRT market. The prosumer needs to take action in three stages; day-ahead,
intraday and real-time. A future local market requires more and faster trans-
actions due to deviations in renewables, volatile loads and activation of reserve
when participating in external flexibility markets (in this case FFR/FCR). A
third stage captures the real-time transactions made to balance these features.
Depending on different realizations in load and reserve bid activation uncer-
tainty, first stage decisions on purchased electricity in the day-ahead market
and reserve bids needs to be done considering all scenarios.
The objective function is shown in (1). We minimize system costs by mini-
mizing the cost of purchased electricity in the day-ahead, EID and ERT markets.
Revenue from reserve market participation is subtracted. If activated, a 10%
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Figure 2: Scenario tree for the three-stage day-ahead, intraday and real-time
clearing market.
discount/premium is added to the activated reserve. A cost of P2P trading is
added to trades done in the IID and IRT markets.
min
∑
pt
χbuypt (P
DA
t + P
GT
t )− χsellpt PDAt − PFCRt (r↑pt + r↓pt)
+
∑
pta
∆τρaP
DA
t (0.9 · pi↓t r↓pt − 1.1 · pi↑t r↑pt)
+
∑
ptl
ρl(|IDptl |P IDt + ψbuypqtlPP2P,IDt )
+
∑
ptτla
ρlρa(|RTptτla|PRTt + ψbuypqtτlaPP2P,RTt ) (1)
Set indices are exclusively related to their sets as shown in the nomenclature
with a ∈ Sa, l ∈ Sl, τ ∈ Tm, t ∈ Th, except for the prosumer indices p, where only
peers with batteries/PV have battery/PV related variables and parameters. In
addition, q is used as the second peer index for P2P trading from peer p to q. For
all realizations of the load uncertainty scenarios l ∈ Sl, the energy balance must
be satisfied, linking the two stages as market position represented by the first
stage variables χbuypt , χ
sell
pt , r
↑
pt and r
↓
pt are the same for all scenarios. Depending
on the load realization, the prosumer needs to balance his net load to match
the day-ahead position. This can be done either by:
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• Charging or discharging the battery,
• Buying or selling electricity on the local P2P intraday market,
• Paying an imbalance cost to the external intraday market,
which is shown in (2). P2P electribity is defined as bought to peer p from
peer q (3).
χbuypt − χsellpt = W loadptl − PVptl + σchptl − σdisptl (2)
+
∑
q∈Pb
(ψsellpqtl − ψbuypqtl) + χID↑ptl − χID↓ptl ∀l, t, p
ψbuypqtl = ψ
sell
qptl ∀l, t, q, p, p 6= q (3)
Reserve market related constraints (4a)-(4e) are only defined for prosumers
p ∈ Pb, as flexibility (in this case a battery) is needed to provide reserve. Reserve
bids are required to be symmetric as described in (4a). The actual activation of
bids in the option market requires constraints limiting the reserve bid volume
not to exceed available flexibility in time step t. The available flexibility has to
be measured in two dimensions; energy (4b)-(4c) and power (4d)-(4e). (4b)-(4c)
restrict reserve bids in t to not exceed the available up- and downward state of
charge planned for t+1, given 100 % activation in the respective direction. (4d)-
(4e) similarly restrict reserve bids to not exceed available (dis)charging power in
t. Note that if a charging action is planned, not charging is equal to delivering
upward reserve, allowing reserve bids to exceed Qchp due to change in the first
stage scheduling.
r↑pt = r
↓
pt ∀t, p (4a)
r↑pt ≤ σsocp(t+1)s ∀l, t, p (4b)
r↓pt ≤ Omaxp − σsocp(t+1)s ∀l, t, p (4c)
r↑pt ≤ Qdisp − σdisptl + σchptl ∀l, t, p (4d)
r↓pt ≤ Qchp + σdisptl − σchptl ∀l, t, p (4e)
It is quite common to ignore modelling of activation of FCR/FFR mainly
for two reasons; the energy delivered over the time period often has a net value
of zero, and conventional power plants can often deliver the requested energy
as long as the capacity has been reserved. This approach does not work well
for batteries, because the energy actually has to be available, and one can not
assume ”unlimited” available fuel. When the TSO activates the capacity bid in
the same direction for multiple time periods, the energy needs to be available
in the battery, also in extreme cases1.
1Of course a penalty cost can be taken if the activation is not respected, but could lead to
exclusion from the market if a trend is spotted by the TSO.
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The battery is modelled as an electricity storage system with min. and max.
state of charge (SOC), (dis)charging power and constant efficiency from the
inverter and electrical components (5a)-(5d). The battery starts with a SOC of
0 %.
σsocp(t+1)s = σ
soc
ptl + σ
ch
ptlη
ch
p −
σdisptl
ηdisp
∀l, t, p (5a)
Ominp ≤ σSOCptl ≤ Omaxp ∀l, t, p (5b)
σchptl ≤ Qchp δ2ndptl ∀l, t, p (5c)
σdisptl ≤ Qdisp (1− δ2ndptl ) ∀l, t, p (5d)
In the third stage, reserve market option bids are activated from 0-100%
in scenarios a ∈ Sa. Hence, in all scenarios a, the activated reserve must be
delivered using the three options:
• Adjusting the second stage battery schedule,
• Buying or selling electricity in the IRT market,
• Buying electricity in the ERT market.
The third stage energy balance is shown in (6) with P2P trading between p
and q (battery peers only) in shown in (7).
σdisptτa − σchptτa + pi↑tτar↑pt − pi↓tτar↓pt = σdisptτa − σchptτa + χRT↑ptτa
− χRT↓ptτa +
∑
q∈P
(ψsellpqtτa − ψbuypqtτa) ∀a, τ, t, p (6)
ψbuypqtτla = ψ
sell
qptτla ∀a, l, τ, t, p, q, p 6= q (7)
The battery is modeled equally in the third stage as in the second stage,
with the addition of a new time index τ representing the five minute intervals
of each activation scenario a (8a)-(8d).
σsocpt(τ+1)a = σ
soc
ptτa + ∆τ(σ
ch
ptτaη
ch
p −
σdisptτa
ηdisp
) ∀a, τ, t, p (8a)
Ominp ≤ σsocptτa ≤ Omaxp ∀a, τ, t, p (8b)
σchptτa ≤ Qchp δ3rdptτla ∀a, τ, t, p (8c)
σdisptτa ≤ Qdisp (1− δ3rdptτla) ∀a, τ, t, p (8d)
4 Case study
In order to illustrate, a case study with 32 peers is tested. The peers are a mix
of prosumers with batteries and photovoltaic production and consumers with
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assets distribution shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. The case study is set up in
order to analyse the synergy between PV production, battery flexibility and pure
consumption. All batteries have 10 kWh with 10 kW maximum (dis)charging
power, whereas all rooftop PV is set to 3 kWp.
Table 1: Share of assets between the peers.
Share 25% 25% 25% 25%
Assets Battery Battery + PV PV -
Figure 3: Community setup. All peers can trade in the second stage, whereas
only peers with batteries can trade in the third stage.
We perform three case studies:
1. Market clearing with P2P trading in the IID and IRT markets. All peers
can trade in the second stage in order to balance under load uncertainty.
Only peers with batteries participate in reserve markets, and thus only
peers with batteries can trade in the third stage for balancing after real-
ization of activation.
2. Market clearing with P2P trading only in the IID market. All peers can
trade in the second stage to balance under load uncertainty. No P2P
trading in the IRT market.
3. Market clearing without P2P trading. End-users can only use their bat-
teries to balance under load and activation uncertainty.
In the first stage, all peers make day-ahead bids in the spot market to cover
their load. In the second stage, the peers can balance their market position de-
pending on the realization of their net load by P2P trade or battery if available.
However, only peers with batteries do P2P trading and balancing in the third
stage, as activation only occurs for peers with batteries.
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The simulation is done for one day with 24 timesteps of one hour in the first
and second stage, whereas there are 12 steps in the third stage (each representing
5 minutes of activation), making a total of 288 time periods. Load data is
taken from real households located in Steinkjer, Norway. To generate load
scenarios, we use load data from five different days with similar temperatures
which represent the forecasted load. All days are taken from the same day of
the week but in different weeks. PV is considered deterministic and is generated
using irradiation data close to the residences.
Activation scenarios are generated using a normal distribution with an ex-
pected value µ = 0 with a standard deviation of σ = 0.3. All randomly drawn
scenarios higher than 100 % activation are clipped to 100 %.
Prices for day-ahead spot market and FCR are acquired from NordPool in
region NO3 with the corresponding grid tariffs from the relevant DSO. In the
case of symmetric bids, FCR prices are taken directly from NordPool. When
activated, peers are getting a 10 % discount and premium for upward and down-
ward reserve energy delivered, respectively. P2P trading is penalized by 5 and
10 % of the day-ahead price in the IID and IRT markets, respectively. This is
to capture costs related to transactions and to incentivize balancing in the first
and second stage, rather than the third stage.
5 Results and discussion
Results show that participation in reserve markets is significantly higher with
peer-to-peer trading enabled. From Figure 4 we see how market participation is
similar during the high price periods in the night, utilizing close to all available
battery capacity. When FCR prices decrease at 5 am, bids in the no and IID
peer-to-peer simulation drop because peers are not able to balance only utilizing
their batteries and need to take too high penalty costs if they bid. Reserve bid
volumes increase somewhat around noon but stay stable below the peer-to-peer
case study where peers are able to bid close to the max of available battery
capacity in all hours until 10 pm. The drop in reserve bids is a result of it
being more profitable to discharge the battery than to participate in the reserve
market, and does not happen if the simulation time horizon does not end.
When the last two hours are excluded from the results, internal peer-to-peer
markets increase participation in reserve markets by 19 and 44 % in the cases
of adding IID and IID + IRT markets, respectively. Table 2 show an increase in
384 and 883 kW of total bids in the simulated time horizon. The results show
that peer-to-peer trading is a powerful market design that significantly increases
end-users possibility to participate in reserve markets, due to the ability to
meet the market position through balancing. Because some peers have low-load
scenarios and others have high, it makes more sense to trade internally than to
face penalties from the external market. This kind of synergy is key to unlock
the potential of reserve provision using local electricity markets to the system’s
advantage.
We visualize the results by showing how the third stage real time market
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Figure 4: Reserve bids with no, IID only and IID + IRT peer-to-peer trading.
Table 2: Reserve bid volumes for the three case studies.
No P2P IID only IID + IRT
Reserve
volume [kW]
1991 2375 (+19%) 2874 (+44%)
balance is done when reserves are activated. Here, reserve bids are activated by
the TSO and peers must deliver the energy required. In Figure 5, an arbitrary
example is shown where reserves are activated with different amplitudes up- and
downward. Balancing is mostly done using the battery. However, in the third
time period, all of the up-reserve is delivered by buying electricity from other
peers on the IRT market. In period 12, 17 and 21, the downward activation is
met by increasing consumption (selling electricity to other peers).
In the case without peer-to-peer trading, activation can only be met by us-
ing the battery or by purchasing the electricity in the external real-time market
(for a high cost). In Figure 6, balance is met only using the battery. Because
the battery is already being discharged as part of the intraday scheduling (rep-
resented by the black line), the battery has to deviate from that schedule and
deliver what is activated. For example, the first period has an activation of ∼1.9
kW. Because the battery is already discharging ∼0.4 kW to meet the intraday
market position, ∼1.9 kW has to be added to this by increasing the discharging
to ∼2.3 kW. In the visualized hour, the net activations are quite close to zero.
In the second hour, the net activation is skewed towards downward delivery.
Because the FCR price in this hour is quite low, no bid is made due to too
high penalty costs in the scenarios where reserves cannot be delivered, unlike
in the peer-to-peer case in Figure 5, where some of the reserves are met using
peer-to-peer trading.
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Figure 5: Prosumer reserve activation balancing in the 3rd stage with peer-to-
peer trading.
In order to incentivize end-users to participate in reserve markets, we find
that the minimum required bid size must be reduced. A community approach
could work as a market player to aggregate flexibility in order to assure accept-
able bid sizes. As batteries and demand response outperform traditional power
plants, end-user flexibility strike as a strong candidate for flexibility provision
in the FFR market.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a three stage community-based peer-to-peer market
clearing model in order to capture the volatility that follows when participating
in FCR markets, simulating a day-ahead, intraday and real-time market in the
first, second and third stage, respectively. We support the idea of a community
manager which handles the day-ahead spot market and reserve bids, based on
historical data for scenario generation and available flexibility. The community
manager also coordinates peer-to-peer transactions when reserves are activated
by the TSO. A clear strength in this approach is to move risk from the end-user
to a professional agent.
By considering uncertainty in net load and reserve activation, community-
based peer-to-peer trading is used to balance the first stage market position on
the day-ahead and reserve market. Results show that reserve bids increase by
19 % and 44 % when IID and IID+IRT markets are introduced, respectively.
Real-time peer-to-peer markets can work as an efficient tool to enable more
end-user participation in FCR.
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Figure 6: Prosumer reserve activation balancing in the 3rd stage without peer-
to-peer trading. No bids are made in the second hour.
Future work is to expand the model to include market clearing with competi-
tion between peers, using equilibrium models or other decomposition techniques
mentioned in the introduction in order to get a clear view of how behaviour
impacts the results compared to our cooperation and cost allocation based ap-
proach. Furthermore, the case study can be expanded by adding multiple flex-
ibility assets such as flexible demand in heat and electric vehicle charging. In
order to incorporate these types of flexibility, asymmetric bids could enable
”one-way” flexibility to participate in FCR.
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